Viet Nam's ethnic minorities tend to be concentrated in remote areas and have lower living standards than the ethnic majority. How much is this due to poor economic characteristics versus low returns to characteristics? Is there a self-reinforcing culture of poverty in the minority group? We find that differences in returns to productive characteristics are an important explanation for ethnic inequality. There is evidence of compensating behavior on the part of the minorities. The results suggest that to redress ethnic inequality, policies need to reach minorities within poor areas and explicitly recognize behavioral patterns that have served them well in the short term, but intensify ethnic differentials in the longer term. q
Introduction
Viet Nam has a large population of ethnic minorities that tend to have appreciably higher concentrations of poverty than the country's Kinh majority. 1 The minority groups also tend to be more concentrated in upland and mountainous areas, often with worse access to public services and lacking basic infrastructure. In recent years, the government has targeted a number of rural development policies to poor areas in which ethnic minorities are found. Although there have been no rigorous evaluations, there is a seemingly widespread perception that such policies have been largely unsuccessful in raising the levels of living of the minority groups.
In confronting this apparent failure, and noting frequent resistance to participating in Ž . development programs, the largely Kinh bureaucrats have tended to argue that the Ž . problem is the ignorance, superstition or irrationality of the minorities Jamieson, 1996 . For example, district health officials-puzzled by why ethnic minorities visit shamans instead of commune health care centers where they benefit from fee exemptions and free medicines-have attributed minority ill-health to Asuperstition and backwardnessB Ž . Ž . MRDP et al., 1999 . An agricultural extension official quoted in Eklof 1995: p. 5 explains AThose farmers who adopt a new technology are labeled progressive, those who don't are backward. But maybe the technology is not appropriate-still the extension workers will try to convince the AbackwardB farmer to adopt it.B
A dissenting view argues that the policies have failed, and sometimes even further disadvantaged minorities, because they are premised on assumptions and models that Ž . simply do not apply to the circumstances of ethnic minorities Jamieson, 1996 . In this interpretation, the minorities have over centuries developed complex farming systems and indigenous practices and knowledge that are well-adapted to their agro-economic environments. Culture, environment and identity are all strongly intermeshed. Piecemeal policy interventions that ignore the overall context are thus doomed to being rejected or to disappointing outcomes. When policies are additionally imbued with prejudice and majority group ethnocentrism they further result in a fraying of indigenous customs and identity, and can lead to greater marginalization.
2 Furthermore, since many of the policies are targeted to 'ethnic minority areas,' not minority households, benefits may well be captured by Kinh households living in these same areas.
Many interventions, from the education system to agricultural research and extension, do appear to be premised on Kinh lowland agro-models and behavior, including cultural Ž . norms Jamieson, 1996; MRDP et al., 1999 . For example, although members of some minority groups do not know the national language, government services and outreach are rarely in minority languages. Agricultural research and extension have not focused on crops and agro-economic systems prevalent in upland areas, but typically on wet rice cultivation and in recent years, cash crops. Few in the uplands have suitable land for the former while the latter bypasses poor minority households who tend to live far from main roads and markets, and do not have access to complementary inputs. The education system follows a nationally set curricula that, it has been argued, is largely irrelevant to local realities and needs.
A central question in this debate is whether the same model generates incomes for majority and minority groups. This paper addresses that question and in doing so aims to 2 Negative views of the minorities, including that they are poorer for AculturalB reasons, and will improve Ž . their situation only by being more like the Kinh, are not uncommon among Viet Nam's majority. Evans 1992 Ž . Ž . relates such attitudes on the part of Vietnamese anthropologists. Also see MPI 1996 , Nakamura 1996 , Ž . Ž Rambo 1997 . Similar attitudes to China's minorities by China's Han ethnic majority are reported Blum, . 1992; Gladney, 1994 . ( ) better understand the sources of observed differences in living standards between the minority and majority ethnic groups in Viet Nam. We ask how important differences in economic characteristics-reflecting access to schooling, land, and other factors-are in explaining differences in welfare. Since Viet Nam's ethnic minorities frequently live in isolated, remote areas, a central question is also how important location is to levels of living. How much does 'where you live within the country' shape the returns to your characteristics, and how does the answer depend on ethnicity?
It is possible, however, that given equal productive endowments and location, the Ž minorities receive lower returns. This could arise from current or past discrimination in . labor or other markets or from differential treatment with respect to public services. Alternatively, it could reflect long term cultural differences that result in the group being less well adapted to current economic conditions. A difference in the underlying models determining incomes would help explain the conflicts over policy noted above. The paper investigates the degree to which differences in living standards are attributable to disparate returns to household characteristics. In short, is it a common model but different endowments that create the income inequality between these groups-as is implicitly assumed in much current policy making-or are there deeper structural differences in the returns to endowments?
The paper also tests for signs of behaviors by ethnic minorities that compensate, at least partially, for differences in returns to productive factors. If minorities obtain lower Ž . returns to education say due to discrimination in labor markets possibly, or to quality differences in the education they receive, then one expects the minorities to develop comparative advantage, and possibly absolute advantage, in activities that do not require education. Depending on what those activities are, this could in turn further reinforce ethnic differences in the longer-term.
One finds discussions of not dissimilar phenomena in the U.S. and European literatures on poverty and social exclusion, whereby a socially or economically excluded group retreats into patterns of behaviors, or survival strategies, that differ from those of Ž . the dominant group for example, Loury, 1999 and Silver, 1994 . Although welfare enhancing to the excluded group in the short-run, it is believed that such behavior entails a 'culture of poverty' that tends also to increase social differentiation and to reduce prospects for escaping poverty in the longer term. In Viet Nam, casual empiricism gives credence to the possibility of a similar process. The ethnic minorities are generally settled in more remote areas, and there is evidence that they engage in different production and land tenure practices and often specialize in the cultivation of non-traditional, and sometimes illegal, crops. Residential differentiation may well partly reflect historical minority preferences to live near ethnically similar households and to be represented by such households on local governing bodies. A push factor might also be present reflecting similar preferences among the majority.
These issues have bearing on appropriate policy responses to ethnic inequality. A common, and natural, policy response in settings such as this is to target extra resources to designated Aminority areasB. For example, Viet Nam's Commission for Ethnic Ž . Minorities and Mountain Areas CEMMA is entrusted, as its name suggests, with programs focusing on the country's minority groups, but also others living in mountain-( )ous areas. Its programs do not make much of a distinction between the Kinh majority and the ethnic minority households living within mountainous Aminority areasB.
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If the main source of ethnic disparities in levels of living is indeed geographic, and intra-area disparities are a secondary issue, then current interventions targeting poor areas with high concentrations of minorities can be expected to work well. If instead we find substantial intra-area disparities, the issue then arises as to how much they reflect differences in readily observable economic characteristics such as schooling, versus differences in returns to the same characteristics. Do differences in living standards persist once we control for geographic fixed effects and household characteristics? What evidence is there for differentiated behavioral patterns between the minority and majority groups? The answers can help guide the current policy debate about how to redress welfare differentials between the ethnic minorities and less disadvantaged groups in Viet Nam.
The paper begins with a review of past approaches to the economic analysis of ethnic disparities, and how the paper's methods differ. Section 3 describes the household-level data set used for the analysis. The paper then explores the determinants of living standards and how they differ between the groups. Section 4 describes the econometric specification, while Sections 5 and 6 discuss the results. A final section summarizes the paper's conclusions.
Framework of analysis
Investigations of ethnic disparities in living standards in developing countries often rely on descriptive decompositions of aggregate poverty andror inequality between ethnic groups. There is a literature that focuses on the contribution of ethnic disparities Ž . to overall measures of inequality Anand, 1983; Glewwe, 1988 . One may of course be concerned about ethnic inequalities in living standards quite independently of their bearing on overall income inequality. Ethnic inequality may well be of concern because of the implications for social functioning and the nature of economic development more broadly. In this paper, we take as our starting point that ethnic disparities are important, and focus instead on the causes of those disparities.
There have been attempts at identifying ethnic discrimination through analysis of Ž . wage earnings disparities for example, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 1994 . This draws on a standard technique in the labor economics literature, known as the Blinder-Oaxaca Ž . decomposition Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973 . Group-specific earnings functions are estimated and the parameters used to decompose the mean inter-group wage differential into that which is attributable to differences in productive characteristics and that which may be attributable to differences in returns to characteristics, as might arise from discrimination.
3 A similar policy operates in China's ethnic areas just across the border from Viet Nam, and there too the policy does not appear to be targeted within the declared Aminority villagesB.
( )
To see how this approach works, let the reduced-form model for the log of earnings Ž . W for the ith individual in the jth group be written as:
where X represents a vector of individual characteristics such as education and work i j experience, with corresponding parameters b , while e is a zero mean error term that j i j is assumed to be uncorrelated with X . Since the fitted regression passes through the i j means, this can be rewritten in a form that decomposes the mean wage differentials between the groups as follows: Ž . where the lnW s and X s represent the predicted mean log earnings and the mean Ž . Ž . characteristics of the respective majority m and ethnic minority e groups. The first Ž . right hand side component in Eq. 2 is the earnings differential attributable to differences in the observed characteristics of the groups, in this case weighted by the parameters estimated for the majority. 4 The second component is that attributable to between-group differences in the returns to given individual characteristics. The labor economics literature refers to the second component as the difference due to AstructureB.
One obvious drawback of the above approach in many developing country settings is that it is limited to the wage labor market. This is not very satisfactory when self-employment in the agricultural or informal sectors is the source of livelihood for most households, and arguably even more so for disadvantaged ethnic groups. Past analyses of ethnic disparities in developing countries have therefore tended to be limited to the minority of urban formal sector employees.
A second issue on which others have also remarked concerns the conventional method's implicit definition of discrimination as lower returns for identical productive Ž . characteristics for example, Gunderson, 1989 . Clearly, differences in mean characteristics between groups can themselves be the product of past unequal treatment and disadvantage. For example, prior discrimination may have meant no access to credit or being pushed into geographical areas of low natural potential. Such treatment will have lowered the returns to given characteristics but also resulted in poorer productive characteristics. This does not invalidate the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, but it does have bearing on its interpretation.
These are compelling concerns in a low-income transitional economy such as Viet Nam. Markets are thin and mobility is limited. In this environment it is even harder to believe that people have themselves chosen their characteristics. If a specific ethnic group was forced at some time in the past into adopting a specific set of low return characteristics-such as living in mountainous areas-then the definition of discrimina-Ž tion in terms of lower returns to the same characteristics is clearly problematic. This need not mean that those same characteristics are endogenous to current living stan- 4 The minority estimated parameters could equally well be used as reference weights giving: ln
There are thus two ways of implementing the decomposition. Since the discrimination free wage structure is not known, choice of the reference group is arbitrary.
( )dards; the deviations from mean characteristics within the ethnic group can still be . orthogonal to the error term.
The standard method for analyzing wage differentials does not identify an explicit role for geography. There are two reasons why one should allow for geographic effects. The first is that in this economy one important characteristic determining living standards is where you live. Mobility has been considerably limited in recent decades. Apart from government resettlement programs to new economic zones, during the 1980s mobility was tightly controlled through a system of residence permits, which were Ž . necessary to obtain subsidized essential goods UNDP, 1998 . Reforms introduced at the end of 1986 largely removed the subsidies but severe institutional constraints continued to impede migration. Access to government services and participation in private transactions to do with land, housing and credit are still firmly linked to the system of Ž . residence permits UNDP, 1998 . Temporary migration of individuals to urban areas has risen but the movement of entire rural households to other rural areas was still relatively rare in the early 1990s. So it can be argued that this is a setting in which location is likely to be a causal determinant of levels of living.
For similar areas in neighboring Southwest China, there is also evidence of significant geographic externalities that suggest that households with identical characteristics Ž would have different rates of consumption growth depending on where they live Jalan
. 5 and Ravallion, 1998 . In this context, a possible explanation for ethnic differences in living standards is differences in location of the groups and nothing to do with differences in returns to characteristics within a location.
A second reason to allow for geographical effects is that omitting them could severely bias estimates of the returns to non-geographic characteristics. In this setting, a potentially serious source of bias is likely to be geographic heterogeneity in the quality Ž . of for example land and education. It can be argued that a good deal of the latent quality differences that one expects to matter to living standards are going to be geographically correlated-to vary more between, than within communes in Viet Nam. This is obvious for land, but may well be no less important for education, given Ž . decentralization and a high degree of self-financing at the local commune level of teachers, school materials and supplies. By introducing geographic effects, one has a better chance of more accurately estimating the returns to the observed characteristics.
Motivated by these concerns, we will depart from the standard approach to analyzing ethnic inequality in certain ways. Given that labor markets are so thin in rural north Viet Nam, instead of examining wages, we focus on a broader measure of individual living standards, or welfare, and conduct the analysis at the more appropriate level of the household. We ask whether there are ethnic differences in living standards controlling Ž for household characteristics, and allowing for geographic effects. Only in the and, as . we have argued, implausible special case in which the geographic effects are uncorrelated with the economic characteristics of households will such a specification give the 5 Strong geographic effects on living standards are also found in countries with few obvious restrictions on Ž . Ž . geographic mobility; see Nord 1998 for the U.S. and Ravallion and Wodon 1999 for Bangladesh.
same results as the standard specification of Eq. 1 in which e is treated as a zero mean white noise error.
We will not, however, interpret the structure component as Adiscrimination.B Such an interpretation is also questionable when one thinks of the likely dynamics of the income generation process. Structural differences may exist in the absence of current discrimination, due, for instance, to a history of past group disadvantage, or simply differential cultural development-possibly perpetuated by policies such as schooling-with a continuing legacy for the returns to economic characteristics. Longstanding differences in group behavior will be embodied in the model parameters for current levels of living. These issues are clearly more relevant to examining living standards than wages, where the market mechanism pushes towards similar returns to productive characteristics. No such mechanism applies to a broader income concept in settings with little or no mobility. So, quite apart from issues of discrimination, understanding how much disparities are due to structure versus different characteristics remains the key to explaining the causes of inequality and designing appropriate policy. Again, the decomposition remains useful, but its interpretation is different to that in the literature on wage discrimination.
Data
To investigate the situation of ethnic minorities in Viet Nam, the study uses the Ž . 1992-1993 Viet Nam Living Standards Measurement Survey VNLSS , a nationally representative, integrated household survey based on sound sampling methods and geared to minimizing non-sampling errors. The survey was implemented by the General Statistical Office with donor funding and technical support. Though administered to each household during only two visits, two weeks apart, the VNLSS allows for data entry to be done in the field and performs range and consistency checks so that any discrepancies can be checked and corrected by re-interviewing the household. It asks detailed questions on many aspects of living standards including household and individual socio-economic characteristics, consumption expenditures, incomes and production. We limit our sample to the 2720 rural households sampled in what we loosely call northern Viet Nam, comprising provinces in the Northern Uplands, North Coast, Red River, the Central Coast and the Central Highlands. The last is usually considered part of South Viet Nam but since it is a mountainous, border area with a historically high concentration of minority population we include it in the analysis. Households of Chinese origin tend to be relatively well-off in Viet Nam and, since our objective is to investigate the determinants of the living standards of relatively under-privileged groups, we lump them together with the majority Kinh population. This gives us a sample of 2254 majority Ž . households Kinh and Chinese and 466 ethnic minority households living in 85 communes. ( )The study's geographical coverage reflects a number of considerations. Our aim is to ensure sufficient variation across minority and majority populations and to cover areas where ethnic minorities reside. A further reason for excluding the Mekong Delta and South East regions is that the rural economy appears to function differently there. These areas had more developed land and labor markets in 1992-1993 than did the rest of Viet Nam. This is clearly a historical difference stemming from the fact that socialist institutional structures ruled in the North for over 30 years, while efforts to replace the South's capitalist economy between reunification in 1975 and the beginning of nationwide reforms in the early to mid 1980s met with much resistance and lasted a fraction of Ž . 7 the time Reidel and Turley, 1999 .
The data contain 'mixed' communes where both ethnic groupings reside, and communes where solely majority or minority households are found. There is a choice between conducting the analysis on all the data versus restricting the estimation to the sample of communes in which both ethnic groups are found. The case for using the entire northern Viet Nam sample is that it helps avoid a problem of selection bias that may arise when restricting the sample to communes with both ethnic groups and that by exploiting all the variance in the data, using the full sample may better enable identification of the parameters. However, limiting the study to the mixed commune case may better pick up differences between ethnic groups that are not associated with geographic differences. Since arguments can be made either way, we present and discuss the regressions on both samples. However, our main focus will be on the larger, representative, sample.
We use household per capita expenditures as our indicator of welfare. There are compelling arguments for using expenditures instead of income to measure well-being. Consumption can, to some extent, be smoothed against income fluctuations. There are also serious concerns about income measurement errors in this context. As Rambo Ž .
1997: p. 25 writes:
Ž Perhaps because many of the commodities being exchanged are illegal opium, . medicinal plants traded to China or do not fall within the standard categories used Ž . for economic data collection minor forest products , the real extent to which the mountain minorities are already deeply involved in the market nexus is not fully recognized. 7 Disparate levels in market development between the North and the South East and Mekong Delta regions Ž . are documented by numerous studies: for example, Salinger 1993 details the underdeveloped state of labor Ž . Ž . markets in Northern relative to Southern Viet Nam; O'Connor 1998 , and Reidel and Turley 1999 discuss other differences. The VNLSS also point to differences. For example, commune level wage data show that labor markets are better developed in these southern regions: both agricultural and unskilled non-agricultural wages are missing for a much larger share of households in the North. Simple means across households in the Mekong Delta and South East versus northern Viet Nam show that sharecropping and land rental is more common, mean income from leasing land much higher and unskilled wage work more frequently available in Ž . the communes of households of the former. van de Walle 2000 finds family labor to be a greater constraining factor in agricultural production in the rural North reflecting the more underdeveloped nature of labor markets there.
( )The existence of illegal income sources could severely bias income-based measures of ethnic inequality, but is less likely to matter to consumption-based measures. The survey focuses effort on carefully collecting consumption expenditures. In addition, expenditures typically provide a better indicator of the current standard of living in poor agricultural economies. They are deflated by region-specific poverty lines to deal with spatial cost-of-living differentials. Monetary amounts are in Vietnamese Dong.
The unconditional means from our data help establish that the minorities do indeed have lower standards of living on average than the majority. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the two groups and indicates a mean per capita household expenditure for the minority groups of just under three quarters the average for the majority. The incidence of poverty is calculated to be 60% for the Kinh and Chinese and 80% for the minorities. 8 Fig. 1 plots the poverty incidence curves giving the cumulative distribution functions of per capita expenditures for every possible poverty line. It shows the disparity in living standards more starkly and indicates first-order dominance. The result that poverty incidence is higher among minority households is also robust to different equivalent scales.
9 Non-income indicators of poverty in Table 1 show the same pattern. Education attainments are clearly lower on average for the minorities. A much higher Ž . proportion belong to illiterate households 12% versus 3% . For 27% of the minority but only 12% of majority households, the most educated member had primary education, while 53% of the latter had a member who attended high school compared to only 31% of minority households.
Given our interest in the role of geographical disparities, it is also useful to examine how community endowments vary across the groups. Table 2 presents means over both groups on whether certain attributes, facilities, and services are found in a household's commune of residence as well as mean distances from the commune center to the closest facilities. Access to infrastructure facilities and services tends to be worse for the 8 For details on the poverty lines see Dollar and Glewwe, 1998 . When we use a lower cutoff point of two-thirds of the poverty line the prevalence drops to 24% for the majority group and 45% for the ethnic minorities.
9

Ž .
We treated the original per capita poverty line z as the per capita expenditure needed to escape poverty u at average household size. So, the poverty line per equivalent single person is z nr n where n is the average household size and u is the size elasticity. At any given u -tested from 0 to 1 at intervals of 0.1-the poverty ranking does not change. minorities. For example, they are much less likely to live in a commune with a Ž . permanent as opposed to a periodic market, a radio station, a health care center and a lower secondary school. Of course, these data tell us nothing about the quality of the facilities, which could well also vary across communes. Distances to the closest facility are also generally larger, with larger variance across communes. Interestingly, the variance in community characteristics across geographic areas tends to be larger for minority households. Finally, indicators of non-farm employment opportunitieswhether unskilled labor work is available and whether there is a large commercial enterprise in the commune-are both higher communes where majority households reside.
A look at household income sources further indicates less diversified livelihoods for Ž . the minorities. Among minority households all but 26% standard deviation of 2.0% Ž derive their incomes solely from own-account farming activities, while 56% standard . deviation of 1.0% of majority households have non-farm incomes sources. The ethnic majority more often combine farming with self-employment in non-farm enterprises or wage-employment.
Econometric specification
Following the discussion in Section 2, household welfare is assumed to be a function of household and community level endowments and other attributes. To explore its Household characteristics include demographics: proportions of children in the 0-to 6-and 7-to 16-year brackets; proportions of male and female adults; and a series of dummy variables describing whether household structure consists of a single individual; a couple; a couple with one, two, or three or more children; a three-generation household; or some 'other' composition.
10 A few variables are specific to the head of household: age and age squared, and gender. We also include a dummy variable for whether the household receives remittances from relatives abroad.
11
Household human capital is measured as a series of dummy variables for the highest education level of the member who has completed the most formal schooling. For example, if the most educated member attended middle school, that dummy has a value of one while all the others are zero. This specification allows us to measure the incremental returns to extra years or levels of education. Education is assumed to be pre-determined to current consumption. However, there could still be omitted variable bias. For example, one likely omitted variable is the quality of education. Disparate returns to schooling across the groups could be picking up either a difference in the returns to quality, or a dissimilarity in how quality differences affect schooling quantity. We return to this point below.
As noted in the Introduction, not speaking the national language could present a severe handicap to minority households. Unfortunately, we are unable to test this satisfactorily. The only indication of language skills in the questionnaire is that related to whether Vietnamese was used for the VNLSS interview. This applies to virtually Ž . everyone in the majority group 99.5% , and almost half of the minority households Ž . 47.4% . There is too little variance to include a language dummy variable in the Ž . majority group regression the effect is in the constant term , and, hence, this is not an appropriate variable for the paper's approach, which requires that the variables appear jointly in both groups' regressions. Out of interest, we did test a dummy variable for language of interview in the minority regression. Contrary to expectations, we found it 10 There are concerns with assuming that the demographics are exogenous. However, one should also recognize that per capita household expenditure may be an imperfect measure of welfare. For example, there may be economies of scale in consumption or differences in needs for different age groups. Thus, demographic controls are needed to deal with heterogeneity in welfare at given expenditures per person.
11 Note that, in as much as it is a dummy variable, it is not affected by differences in levels of remittances among recipients. While there may nonetheless be endogeneity concerns about this variable, we believe it would be worse to exclude it. The dummy could well proxy for important unobserved factors that affect consumption, such as the household's connections and political clout in the commune and at higher levels of government.
( )to be insignificant. 12 These results probably indicate that language of interview is a poor measure of a household's Vietnamese language skills and should not be taken as conclusive evidence that language is not important.
We also include as explanatory variables the total area of different types of land cultivated by the household in the last 12 months. Land is disaggregated into area of irrigated and non-irrigated annual crop land, perennial crop land, forest, water surface Ž . Ž most often used for the culture of fish , and other land consisting of vacant lots, bald
. 13 hills, burnt and fallow land, river banks, road and dike sides . To measure land quality, we enter the shares of total irrigated and non-irrigated land recorded in the survey as locally rated of good quality. Land markets did not exist at the time of data collection. But even though households did not flexibly and freely choose land, the possibility of endogeneity cannot be fully dismissed here either. Within communes, land allocations were made by local administrations. Original household allocations of annual crop land often date back to 1988 and were usually made on a per labor unit basis and allowing Ž for quality differentials and water access. Other land types perennial, forest and other . land were distributed as late as 1991 or later, and appear to have frequently been 14 Ž . subject to greater local discretion. For example, Donovan et al. 1997 report great variation in how the national land tenure regulations have been applied in the country's northern regions. They found that common criteria for distributing forest and other land included evidence of sufficient household labor, capital, and ability to make investments. They also describe numerous instances of apparent favoritism in forest and other land allocation, with outcomes commonly favoring privileged village households.
The process of local land allocation suggests possible endogeneity, whereby some land assets are a function of latent factors such as local political influence or access to capital that also influence consumption but are not in the regression. The land coefficients then reflect both the returns to land and to those omitted variables. We will return to this point when interpreting our results.
Finally, we include dummy variables for the commune in which the household lives. As emphasized in Section 2, in this particular setting it can be argued that location is largely exogenous and has a direct causal effect on living standards. Allowing for commune fixed effects also helps deal with potential bias in other parameters of interest. As also discussed in Section 2, latent factors that may be correlated with included variables, and directly influence the dependent variable, are likely to be geographically correlated. Communes are relatively small and the commune effects should adequately capture differences in inter-commune quality of land and education attributes, local infrastructure development, geo-environmental attributes, prices, and other community 12 It was insignificant everywhere except in the sample limited to communes where both groups are found, without fixed effects. The effect disappeared when commune effects were entered.
13 Any swidden land that was cultivated during the last year is included in annual crop land. Swidden land is more commonly cultivated by the minorities. Unfortunately, the survey does not collect information on area of swidden land left fallow in the last year but available to the household. 14 Ž . For example, see the commune case studies reported in Donovan et al. 1997, vol. 2 . Also see Jamieson Ž .
.
( )level factors. This helps deal with the likely correlation between the included variables -notably land and education-and location. Without geographical fixed effects a bias is probable. There may of course still be some bias due to intra-commune differences in omitted variables-including possible factors influencing within commune land allocations as noted above-but we can do nothing about this.
We run two sets of regressions. The first includes household level characteristics excluding location. Since differences in the returns to those characteristics may well reflect where one lives, we then run the regressions with commune fixed effects and test for the influence of locational factors on the returns to household characteristics. In all regressions, we estimate the standard errors using the Huber-White correction for heteroscedasticity and we correct for the non-zero covariance within communes due to Ž . sample design using the robust cluster option in STATA 6 . Table 3 presents the regression results for the majority and minority groups on the full northern Viet Nam sample. Chow tests on these regressions reject the null Ž Ž . . hypothesis that the parameters are the same for the two groups F s 4.64 34,84 when Ž geographical fixed effects are excluded. Testing the joint restrictions including com-. mune coefficients is not possible when controlling for fixed effects since the number of variables is now different in the two regressions as a result of both groups not being found in all communes. However, we can still test for whether the coefficients on household variables excluding location are the same; this test rejects the null that they Ž Ž . . are F s 36.48 31,84 . Table 4 gives the same regressions restricted to the sample of 704 households-366 majority and 338 minority-residing in mixed communes. Chow tests also convincingly reject identical parameters both without and with fixed effects.
Discussion of results
15
The minority level regressions are rather similar for both samples, but some qualitative differences arise in the majority group regressions. In general, the estimated parameters in Table 4 have higher standard errors which would seem to support exploiting the higher variance found in the larger sample. The discussion focuses on the regressions in Table 3 since this is the full sample, representative of northern Viet Nam. Important qualitative differences in the estimation performed on the sub-sample of mixed communes only are noted as we go along. Ž . Subtracting the minority from the majority regression both with commune effects tells us about the contribution to ethnic inequality of a change in specific household attributes, controlling for commune of residence. The constant term-combining the joint effects of excluded dummy variables-contributes positively to inequality between the groups, as do the education variables, the receipt of remittances dummy, household size, the household composition variables, the share of good quality irrigated land and forest land. Other types of land, a male household head and household structures other 15 This is true using robust standard errors, both with and without cluster effects. However, on the model Ž estimated allowing for clustering, we can only test up to 21 constraints at a time equal to the number of . clusters minus one .
( )than the left-out 'couple,' reduce inequality. The following discussion goes into more detail.
Demographic effects
Although on balance the size of the demographic variable parameters favors the majority group, demographic effects are similar across the groups and regressions with and without fixed effects. Household size has a strong negative impact on welfare. Compared with the omitted share of members aged under six, higher shares of all other members have significant positive impacts on living standards. The household structure variables have no apparent explanatory power with the exception of the negative effect of being a one-child couple compared to a couple alone for the majority when we control for location. This last effect disappears in the mixed commune sample.
Returns to education
Striking differences arise in the education parameter estimates. They are consistently positive and significant for both groups but returns to education are substantially higher for the minority in the regression not allowing for commune effects. An increment to per capita consumption expenditures of 75% of original consumption is indicated as a result of the most educated member completing primary schooling. The cumulative impact of completing middle school is to raise per capita consumption by 84%, and of high school to more than double it. By contrast, returns for the majority are, respectively: 22%, 34% and 49% over original consumption per person. The cumulative advantages of education to the ethnic minorities are maintained through vocational or university education, though the returns are diminishing the higher the education level. Looking at the non-fixed effects results, one might feel justified in concluding that as education expands, this will in itself reduce and eliminate ethnic inequality, obviating any need to target.
However, given the impediments to migration, a generalized policy of education expansion is not the solution. Education is closely linked with where a minority household resides, so that once one introduces the geographic effects, the results change dramatically: differences in the returns to education between ethnic groups are reversed. Although impacts on minority living standards remain positive and significant, their magnitude declines to the point of being lower than those estimated for the majority for all but primary schooling. By contrast, the majority parameter estimates are much less affected by omitting the geographic effects. This is shown in Fig. 2 which plots the cumulative returns to education relative to being illiterate for both groups with and without the fixed effects. Note that the figure shows the proportionate gains to Ž . consumption. Since the proportionate gains with fixed effects are higher for the majority, and they are also on average richer, the level consumption gains from education must be even higher for the majority.
In other words, we find that the differences in returns are strongly associated with where a minority household lives. There are large unconditional returns to schooling to minorities, but the difference upends when comparing ethnic minority and non-minority Note: the regression omits the proportion of members aged 0-6; households that consist of a couple; illiterate education status. We leave out the commune fixed effects for ease of presentation. t-Ratios are estimated using Ž . the robust cluster option in STATA 6.0 1999 . households in the same place. The ethnic differences in unconditional returns thus arise from the geographic distribution of ethnic groups such that the real difference between high education, high consumption minority households and those with low education and low consumption is in where they live. Under-developed labor markets and considerable immobility allow this to happen.
These results suggest a substantial bias in the estimated returns to schooling for the minorities when not controlling for commune effects. The key omitted characteristic is likely to be the quality of education, which is itself determined geographically for the minority group. Our results are consistent with a situation in which the places where living standards are higher for the minority are places where education quality tends to be better, and the latent quality differences are positively correlated with quantities of 16 Ž education. However, we do not find a similar bias for the majority noting that the . regressions with and without fixed effects are similar for the majority . Either there are 16 Notice that both conditions are required. The omitted variable bias is the coefficient of the omitted variable in the main regression times the regression coefficient of the excluded variable on the included variable. Note: the regression omits the proportion of members aged 0-6; households that consist of a couple; illiterate education status. We leave out the commune fixed effects for ease of presentation. t-Ratios are estimated using Ž . the robust cluster option in STATA 6.0 1999 . few quality differences for the majority, or the differences are uncorrelated with differences in observed quantities. We cannot say which it is.
( )
The seemingly high returns to minority education suggested by the model without commune effects appear to be due not to education but to the combined effect of restrictions on migration and geographical differences in the provision of education services. These have simultaneously created large intra-commune differences in consumption and education levels for the minorities. This results in high estimated returns Ž . to education without fixed effects , and suggests potentially large returns to minority Ž migration. The fact that this does not happen for majority households whose mobility is . also restricted suggests that the provision of education has been more equitable across majority areas.
17
Commune fixed effects have a similar impact on the mixed commune sample regressions. Minority returns to education-though they are not higher than those for the 17 When we drop the receipt of income from relatives abroad dummy, the results are almost identical, but with slightly higher returns to education for both groups. This is consistent with it proxying for omitted indicators of, for example, political importance in the community. Leaving it in is likely to give better estimates of the returns to education. The dummy is non-zero for only 3% of majority and 1% of minority Ž . households. Details available from the authors. majority when not controlling for commune effects-undergo a proportionately larger decline than the majority's with commune effects. Large differences in the returns to education remain-with minorities getting lower returns with and without fixed effects on the smaller sample. 
Returns to land
Joint significance tests of the linear and quadratic terms show that perennial, water surface, and irrigated land are significant at the 5% level in all regressions, except for irrigated land in the minority without fixed effects, where it is significant at the 10% level. Non-irrigated land has little explanatory power in any regressions. Other land is Ž . significant 5% level in both majority regressions, and in the minority fixed effects at the 10% level. In addition, the forest land variables are significant in the majority fixed Ž . effects 5% .
To see how the returns to land assets vary across the groups, we create Fig. 3a and b, Ž . which analogously to Fig. 2 for education plots proportionate consumption gains for different amounts of land relative to having no land. To deal with the different land Ž . types, we create a land bundle identical for both groups combining the relativities of Ž all land types at the mean. This bundle therefore contains a fixed share of good and bad . quality irrigated and non-irrigated land, and other land types and is expressed in 18 We cannot reject the null that the education coefficients are the same on the smaller sample of communes where both groups live. Although the returns are higher for the majority with fixed effects, collinearity between education and other regressors is no doubt raising the standard errors.
Ž . Ž . Fig. 3 . a Returns to land by ethnicity. b Returns to land by ethnicity mixed communes only . different total amounts. Thus, using the parameter estimates for each group, we plot the group-specific proportionate consumption gains from different quantities of land, holding quality constant. 19 We first discuss the full sample results given in Fig. 3a .
19 At zero land, per capita consumption of the groups will differ. The graph should not be interpreted as saying that the minorities have higher consumption at any given amount of land.
( )The regression without geographic effects gives implausible results: returns to land for the majority are actually negative. For both groups returns appear to be underestimated. These results are consistent with the land parameters in the regressions without fixed effects picking up the effects of omitted cross-commune quality of land variations that one would expect to be negatively correlated with quantities of land. If high quality is associated with lower quantities of land across locations, then returns to land will be underestimated unless one controls for commune effects. We also find that the marginal returns to aggregate land are higher for the ethnic minority groups, especially controlling for where they live.
20 Analogously to Fig. 2 , we note that the differences in the gains to levels of consumption will be lower than the plotted proportionate gains since the minority group is poorer. However, the gains in levels are still larger than for the Ž majority group given that the proportionate difference in returns to land with fixed . effects is so much larger than the proportionate difference in consumption.
The minorities obtain higher increments to consumption from extra land ceteris Ž . paribus Fig. 3a . This is the opposite of what we would expect if there was a bias due to endogeneity of administrative land allocation, as discussed in Section 4. A priori, one expects omitted attributes such as access to credit or political clout to be more strongly correlated with land allocation for the majority group. When we examine individual land types, we find similar patterns for all but forest land, where returns favor the majority. The available evidence points to the allocation of forest land being more subject to Ž . idiosyncratic household characteristics than other land types Donovan et al., 1997 . The returns to forest land may reflect an over-estimation of the coefficients due to latent omitted variables. But this cannot explain our results for aggregate land.
Clearly, there must be one or more inputs that ethnic minority households supply in greater quantity so as to obtain a larger output from the same land. What could that be? The available evidence makes it implausible that the minority households are less credit constrained at any given amount of land and generally have access to more productive inputs such as machinery or extension services than the majority. 21 One interpretation for these findings is that minority households are working harder on their own land to compensate for their lack of off-farm opportunities. In general, minority households have lower levels of education, larger size, fewer children in school, fewer outside non-farm economic opportunities, and face an even thinner labor market than others given where they live. They then have little choice but to work harder on their land. 22 20 We tested the results by running alternative specifications including one with total land, total land squared and shares of each type of land making up the total to take into account land type and quality. The pattern evidenced in Fig. 3 is closely repeated each time. We therefore stayed with our functional form as it is more flexible, and, hence, econometrically preferred, than the alternatives. 21 Ž . Ž . Lower access is documented in, for example, MRDP et al. 1999 , and Jamieson 1996 . 22 There is a possible alternative explanation for the higher returns to land for the minorities. As mentioned, more among the minority cultivate swidden land. If they also generate income from the unobserved swidden land left fallow, then the results could reflect omitted variable bias. However, the direction of the bias will depend on whether the area of fallow swidden land is positively or negatively correlated with currently cultivated land area. A positive correlation would result in an overestimation of the returns to land and could explain our results, while a negative correlation would underestimate returns. We think it unlikely that a positive correlation is a general tendency.
( )Mean hours worked on one's own household farm from the survey data provide strong corroboration for this interpretation. Converting yearly hours worked per household into 8-h day equivalents gives a mean of 397 days across the majority households versus 697 days for minority households.
23 Unfortunately, we are unable to express time worked per land area since the survey provides no information on labor time by land type. Instead, we run a regression of the log of total hours worked on one's farm for the entire Ž . sample against land variables including squared terms and the land quality variables and a dummy taking the value one if the household is minority and zero otherwise. The Ž . estimated coefficient is 0.45 t s 4.75 . This suggests close to 50% higher labor time for minority households at given amounts and quality of land.
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A likely contributory factor is that the minorities as a whole are more adept at exploiting high-return, non-traditional, agricultural and forest products. This is likely to require an intimate knowledge of the ecosystem, inputs and how remunerative certain non-traditional and sometimes illegal products are. Minorities have often lived in the same areas for generations. Their long confinement in these areas has no doubt fostered a lot of specialized agro-environmental knowledge that helps to optimize land use and maximize output. These effects are likely to be reinforced by the minority group's lack of more traditional alternatives, and greater inaccessibility and distance from public interest and policing.
Thus, it can be argued that the forces that led to the high concentrations of minorities in upland and mountainous areas may well have the effect that the marginal returns to land are actually higher for them. In this case, as a result of the poorer ethnic group experiencing lower access to off-farm work, reduced access to good quality flat land and complementary inputs such as capital, it compensates in ways that result in higher returns to land. Nonetheless, despite the minorities' additional efforts and specialized knowledge, their consumption remains lower. 25 An interesting change in the structure of returns to land occurs when we focus solely on the mixed commune sample. As can be seen in Table 4 , there are some changes in the majority regressions-forest land becomes insignificant and perennial land significant. Here too, returns are underestimated for both groups when not controlling for commune effects. But when we do, minority returns to land fall absolutely while those to the majority rise absolutely relative to that in the full sample, to a point where returns to land are somewhat higher for the majority in the common commune sample. 
Ž
We tested a number of alternative specifications without the squared land terms; including all other household characteristics; including commune dummies; limiting the sample to households in communes . where both groups live . Without exception, we get strong positive and significant effects of minority household status on hours of farm work. 25 An implication of the findings is that there are land transfers from majority to minority that would raise average consumption over both groups, and enhance both efficiency and equity. Such trades are not occurring given non-existent land markets. The administrative land allocation appears to be creating efficiency losses. The situation is akin to the classic case of inequality impeding growth whereby the poor have higher marginal Ž . returns because they cannot get inputs such as credit Binswanger et al., 1995 . sample may well be caused by selection bias, one source of which could be that in places where both groups live, administrative land allocations or inputs favor the majority. Communes with mixed populations appear to be untypical of northern Viet Nam. Minority returns to land are higher over the sample as a whole. But despite the minorities working longer hours at given land amounts and quality in mixed communes as well, their returns are lower in communes where they compete with the majority. 
Returns to location
Ž A similar comparison can be made of the estimated commune effects the h's in Eq. Ž .. 3 , but only for the regression run on the sample of communes that are home to households from both groups.
27 Fig. 4 plots the commune coefficients estimated for the majority against those estimated for the minority group. With very few exceptions, returns to a specific geographic location are higher for the minorities. In a way similar to 26 In mixed communes, minority male adults work the equivalent of 258 eight-hour days, female adults 279, and children 120, versus 174, 207, and 74, respectively, for the majority household members. 27 The coefficients are estimated relative to a left-out commune, and so change according to the omitted communes.
( )what we found for land, the minorities appear to be specializing and drawing greater advantage from location attributes. As a result they achieve higher returns, compared to the majority living in the same places. This partly, though only partly, compensates for lower consumption.
Summarizing the regressions
We find that excluding commune effects results in severe omitted variable bias. This reflects the fact that non-geographic variables tend to be geographically correlated. Geography also independently affects living standards as indicated by significant commune effects. Where you live matters much more to the ethnic minorities' consumption levels than to the majority's. Greater geographic variance in living standards exists among minority households. Because omitted geographic variables for the minorities tend to be more positively correlated with desirable household characteristics, omitting the fixed effects tends to overestimate the returns to desirable household characteristics. In the full sample, land is to some degree offsetting because its returns respond to added effort and input by minority households-making up for their lack of outside income earning opportunities in certain geographic areas. This does not hold for mixed communes, where access to other inputs or quality differences appear to favor the majority. There is also evidence of compensating effects of location. A component of consumption is due purely to where a household resides. Average consumption is lower for the minority groups but absolutely more of that consumption is due to where they live.
Aggregate differences in returns
As we have seen, there are both positive and negative compensating influences on ethnic inequality emanating from differences in the returns to the same characteristics. We now ask how much, in aggregate, differences in returns account for differences in living standards. We decompose the between-group difference in log per capita consumption expenditures using the methods discussed in Section 2. We use alternatively the majority and minority parameters as reference weights. The decomposition is undefined for the full sample with commune fixed effects because of the missing parameter when only one group is present in the sample for a commune.
28 It can be done for the fixed effects model only on the sample limited to households living in communes where both minority and majority are found. This decomposition also allows us to test for the possibility that differences in characteristics across the full sample reflect in part differences among the majority households across communes in which very few minority households are found. Table 5 presents the results. 28 The decomposition is highly sensitive to the reference when the regressors are not observed for all groups. For the whole sample, we find that the difference in log consumption per capita between the majority and minority groups is almost equally explained by differences in Ž . Ž . characteristics 52% and differences in the returns to those characteristics 48% . The component due to characteristics increases slightly when we use the minority parameter Ž . weights instead 56% . This changes dramatically when we limit the sample to communes in which both groups reside. Then we find negligible difference due to characteristics, with disparities in living standards entirely attributable to different returns. This is true using either reference weights, and with and without geographic fixed effects. Omitting communes without minority households greatly compresses the variance in household characteristics. The positive component attributable to differences in characteristics in the whole sample is thus entirely due to the advantageous characteristics of majority households in non-minority areas.
In order to get a sense of the extent of structural inequality within communes, we next set a reference household-where the reference is overall sample mean characteristics excluding location-common to all areas and both ethnic groups. We then predict, based on the regression coefficients allowing for commune fixed effects, what log per capita expenditures would be in each commune for each ethnic group if all characteristics were identical except for location and ethnicity. For each commune, there are either one or two predicted values depending on whether both groups reside there. Two predicted values enable us to compare the groups within a commune controlling for household characteristics. Fig. 5 graphs predicted log per capita expenditures for the majority against the same for the minority for the communes where both groups reside. Thus, similarly to Fig. 4 , each point represents one commune. The figure clearly shows that even when household characteristics including location are identical, minority households in Viet Nam have lower predicted living standards than majority households. This again underlines the finding that, although a large part of ethnic inequality controlling for differences in household characteristics can be attributed to geographical attributes, not all of it can. Our results point to the importance of differing returns to economic characteristics. A less significant role is played by inter-group differences in household characteristics other than in where they live.
Conclusions
In principle, there are two possible approaches to redressing the ethnic inequality found in many developing countries. One approach assumes that the model generating the incomes of the better-off group will work if only it is applied to the other group. The second approach assumes that the two models are fundamentally different, and that only by working with the actual model appropriate to the worse-off group will the ethnic inequality be redressed. This paper tries to determine which approach is the right one in the case of Viet Nam.
The differences in levels of living in northern rural Viet Nam are due in part to the fact that the minorities live in less productive areas, with difficult terrain, poor infrastructure and lower accessibility to the market economy and off-farm work. There are large regional differences in living standards and considerable immobility, so that geographic disparities tend to be persistent.
But disparities in levels of living between the minority and majority are not just a matter of geography. We also find large differences within geographical areas, which persist even after controlling for household characteristics. Interestingly, a non-geo-( )graphic model of living standards actually hides the magnitude of these intra-locational disparities. This is because geographic characteristics matter more to the minorities and the geographic effects are correlated with their other characteristics. Living in areas with worse infrastructure, worse access to markets and so on, tends to be associated with less rewarding non-geographic household characteristics, and this effect is stronger for the minorities.
A model of living standards that allows for ethnic differences and geographic effects thus provides two main insights. First, a larger component of the variance in minority consumption is due to where a household lives. This holds even when focusing on the communes in which both groups are found. Second, allowing for geographic effects gives a very different picture of the structure of returns to given household characteristics-notably education and land. In this setting, there appears to be a severe bias in the assessments of the role played by the differences in returns to non-geographic characteristics in models that do not allow for geographic effects on living standards. We have argued that the most plausible explanation for this bias is that there is an unobserved geographic heterogeneity in the quality of land and education. Our results are consistent with these omitted geographic differences in land quality being negatively correlated with land quantities. Education quality disparities on the other hand appear to be positively correlated with schooling quantities, though much more so for the minorities. The methods used here can deal with geographic endogeneity of characteristics, but there may also be latent within-commune differences in education quality, for example. We could then be overestimating returns to the majority relative to the minorities if the returns to quality are higher for the majority or if inter-household differences in education quantity within communes are more responsive to latent quality differences for the majority than minority households. There is no obvious reason why these conditions would hold, but they cannot be ruled out.
At given characteristics, we find that there are systematic differences not attributable to where you live. Indeed, if we look solely at communes where both groups live, differences in characteristics no longer account for any of the difference in average consumption. These results lead us to conclude that fundamentally different models generate incomes for the majority and minority groups.
We find significant differences in the returns to education within communes. Overt forms of discrimination in markets cannot be ruled out. However, two other explanations are just as likely. Differences in returns to education could arise from differences in access and mobility within communes, or from differences in the quality of education between the two groups, such as a AKinh-centricB schooling, inappropriate to the minority group's culture. Lower returns need not be the result of current discrimination; more deeply rooted historical and cultural processes-possibly reflecting a history of past discrimination-could well be the source.
However, it is not the case that minority groups obtain lower returns to all characteristics. The ethnic differences in returns are more complex than that. A rational response to lower returns for an ethnic sub-group in one activity is to retreat into another activity, less prone to the problem. The revealed structural difference in the returns to schooling is likely to affect how hard families in the minority group work on their own land and the cropping decisions they make. The returns to one's land depend heavily on ( )own effort and family labor endowments. A possible outcome then is that the disadvantaged ethnic group achieves higher returns in activities such as subsistence farming, gathering forest products and cultivation of non-traditional crops.
We find strong evidence for this effect in the marginal returns to land for the ethnic minorities in the full sample. The component attributed to differences in returns in the decomposition is picking up other such 'compensating effects.' For example, the pure returns to location-even when in remote, inhospitable areas-tend also to be higher for the minorities. Such behavior improves their consumption levels, though it is not sufficient to overcome the large differential with the majority.
In reducing poverty among Viet Nam's minorities and reducing this dimension of inequality, there is an important role for geographically targeted programs aimed at poor areas. However, our results also suggest that it is not sufficient to only target interventions to poor areas, even with relatively high concentrations of ethnic minority groups. Policies for fighting poverty among the minorities that assume the Kinh model will continue to be ineffective. The paper's results clearly point to the need for specific interventions within geographically targeted poor area development programs to be appropriately tailored to, and narrowly focused on, the problems, needs, and situation of minority households. Only in this way can policy eventually succeed in raising minority household returns to given characteristics to the levels enjoyed by neighboring majority households.
Effective policies should also recognize the compensating behaviors we have identified, and other forms of behavioral responses on the part of the minorities. A history of lower returns to certain non-geographic characteristics has generated higher returns to land and location for the minority groups. This is inequality reducing though it may well reinforce ethnic differences in the longer term. The minorities have developed a comparative advantage in location but it is also location that makes them more remote, more difficult to integrate and costlier to reach with social services and physical infrastructure. In helping redress current inequalities, it will be necessary to open up Ž options for minority groups both by assuring that they are not disadvantaged in for . example labor markets, and by breaking the conditions that have caused their isolation and social exclusion.
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